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2 Introduction and Synopsis 
The current doctoral thesis investigates human (non-)rational choice behavior in static and dy-
namic situations under risk. The research in this thesis comprises a literature review about dy-
namic decision-making on low probability events with high negative consequences and five 
experimental studies about individual choice behavior in the domains of ethics, health and 
shadow economy. Insights from the field of behavioral economics are used to conceptualize the 
economic world with more realistic psychological foundations, while the predictions of the 
proposed behavioral models are empirically validated by the methods of experimental econom-
ics.  
Traditional models of choice under uncertainty which rely on solid axiomatic systems and ra-
tionality principles have often been challenged on several grounds from both within and outside 
economics.1 With regard to modern economic theory as a descriptive enterprise, there is a great 
deal of evidence which suggests that a variety of behavioral factors appear to be highly conse-
quential for economic outcomes, yet dismissed by classical theory, implicitly or explicitly, as 
unimportant details (Shafir, 2007). Moreover, explored mainly by psychological research and 
summarized under the term bounded rationality (Selten, 1998; Simon, 1972), systematic biases 
manifested in the beliefs people have and choices they make run profoundly counter to what, 
in the formal world, is envisaged as rational agents.2 These two components seem to be espe-
cially entailed in economic situations considered in this thesis. For example, the traditional 
framework by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) which models tax evasion as individual choice 
under risk and uncertainty predicts only poorly how people actually decide about paying taxes 
(Kirchler et al., 2007). Factors going beyond parameters like income, tax rate, detection proba-
bility and sanctions seem to matter for the tax payer. In dynamic situations with repeated deci-
sions, decision-makers tend to misperceive the cumulative nature of risk (Slovic, 2000), ignore 
low-probability events (Kunreuther et al., 2001) or violate the principles of dynamic rational 
choice (Machina, 1989). So far, there is no economic model based on rational choice which 
might explain why patients stop taking their medicine at some point in the medical treatment, 
leave alone predicting patient behavior given costs, benefits and risks of (non-)complying with 
medication (Elliot et al., 2008).  
                                                 
1For surveys, theoretical developments and empirical findings see for example Camerer, 1995; Chew and Mac-
Crimmon, 1979; Chew et al., 1991; Fishburn, 1988; Hey, 1984; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; MacCrimmon and 
Larsson, 1979; Machina, 1987; Quiggin, 1982; Starmer, 2000; Sugden 1986; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; We-
ber and Camerer, 1987. 
2Some illustrative examples of biases in judgments include overconfidence, optimism, anchoring, status quo and 
extrapolation (Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). 
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The central aim of the thesis is therefore to propose and empirically validate alternative models 
of individual choice based on principles of behavioral economics. At the core of behavioral 
economics is the conviction that standard economic frameworks enriched with psychological 
foundation will make the models more accurate and increase the understanding of the field of 
economics on its own terms (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2003; Diamond and Vartiainen, 2007). 
Accordingly, practicing behavioral economics requires the modification of only few assump-
tions of the standard theory in the direction of greater psychological realism without abandoning 
the key methodological principles of modern economics. 
The following lines provide some background and briefly introduce the six papers of the doc-
toral thesis.  
The first paper, Djawadi, B. M. (2016), reviews the literature about risk perception and choice 
behavior in dynamic situations with repeated decisions of low-probability, high-consequence 
events. This kind of situation often occurs in daily life, i.e. making many car trips during a year, 
smoking cigarettes over a long period of time or frequently investing in stocks with low risks 
of a total loss. All the described situations under risk and uncertainty potentially generate an 
anomaly: while the single probability of an event with high negative consequences may be 
small, being exposed to the same situation repeatedly over time however makes the one-time 
occurrence of this event highly probable. As the negative consequences in form of an accident 
or a medical hazard are either lethal or, in form of severe financial damages, crucial for future 
life, the impact of judgment and choices about these low-probability, high-consequence events 
deserves special attention. Evidence is presented which demonstrates that people violate the 
principles of rationality and make their decisions in isolation instead of integrating all future 
consequences. Moreover, errors in belief formation lead to judgments which do not coincide 
with those obtained by probability theory and Bayesian updating. The basic proposition of this 
literature review is that policy-makers can benefit from an integrated view of psychological 
factors and economic (non-)rational choice behavior so that a better understanding of how peo-
ple think and make decisions about cumulative risk of extreme events conceivably leads to 
effective policies and risk management strategies. 
The second paper, Djawadi, B.M. and Fahr, R. (2013), studies the impact of risk perception 
and risk attitudes on corrupt behavior. Petty corruption describes the situation in which the 
public official frequently engages in illegal actions where small amounts of bribes are involved 
and the detection rate is rather low. In this respect, this situation is an application of the afore-
mentioned dynamic situations with repeated decisions of low-probability, high-consequence 
events. The probability of being detected when taking bribes may be very small in each case. 
However, since getting caught terminates the career of a public official, what matters is the 
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overall probability of getting caught once, which is much higher if the public official habitu-
ally engages in corruption. To abstract from confounding effects of reciprocal behavior, we 
design an experiment where a public official decides upon accepting a bribe that leads to a 
higher present period income while facing the risk of being audited and being left with a con-
siderable lower income in all subsequent periods. Because risk attitudes might differ when put-
ting earned versus endowed income at risk, treatments are compared in which participants either 
receive an endowment beforehand, or earn their income by conducting a real effort task in every 
period. Independent of the treatments, high rates of corruption can already be found in very 
early periods which suggest a systematic underestimation of the overall probability of being 
audited. Risk attitudes measured with a subsequent lottery-choice experiment do not correlate 
with the behavior observed in the corruption experiment. These findings have important polit-
ical implications because the underestimation of the total risk involved in engaging in corrupt 
behavior might nullify measures to fight petty corruption by increased governmental auditing. 
The third paper, Djawadi, B.M. and Fahr, R. (2014), investigates how firstly tax knowledge 
about public expenditures and secondly taxpayers’ influence on budget spending affects tax 
compliance. Embedded in two hypothetical tax systems with high and low power of authorities 
respectively, we investigate in which specific tax system transparency and taxpayers’ control 
over the use of the taxes are of major relevance. To clearly disentangle any effect from factors 
that are known to influence tax compliance from previous studies, we control for tax commit-
ment, risk attitude, income and effort exerted on the task in the experiment. Tax compliance is 
higher in tax systems with low power of authorities when providing complete transparency 
about public expenditures and when taxpayers are given the possibility to decide on the use of 
their taxes. With a powerful tax authority in place which is reflected in high audit rates, this tax 
knowledge and the influence on budget spending do not affect compliance rates. We find that 
tax commitment, income and real effort are not related to tax compliance and thus do not ex-
plain our results. However, we find evidence that compliance increases with the degree of risk 
aversion. These results have important policy implications as obviously the mere hypothetical 
possibility of expressing preferences concerning budget spending influences tax compliance. 
Tax authorities can provide taxpayers with information along with the annual tax declaration 
about the different tax items, the volume of the federal budget and a feedback mechanism to 
express preferences about the allocation of their tax dollars.  
The fourth paper, Djawadi, B.M. and Fahr, R. (2015), generates evidence with a field experi-
ment on the pervasiveness of cheating in professional contexts. Over the last decade ethical 
issues in business received more and more attention. Rather than adopting a prescriptive or 
normative approach which uses insights from philosophy to describe how people should behave 
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in ethical dilemma situations, the field of behavioral ethics describes the actual behavior of 
people, the influence of social and situational factors on ethical decision-making and studies 
how decisions can be nudged towards a more ethical direction with simple interventions (Ba-
zerman and Gino, 2012). Given the huge economic damage that unethical behavior causes by 
evading taxes or insurance fraud, it is not surprising that economists are also interested in the 
overall distribution and the determinants of lying and cheating in professional contexts.  We 
argue that lying in professional contexts share three characterizing features: 1) the gain from 
the dishonest behavior is uncertain, 2) the harm that lying may cause to the other party is only 
indirect and 3) lies are more indirect lies by action or written statements.  Conducted as a field 
experiment with a heterogenous group of participants during a University “Open House Day”, 
our “gumball-machine-experiment” provides evidence that more than 32% of the population 
cheats for their own gain. Regarding highest educational level and professional status we find 
that students cheat significantly more than non-students, i.e. pupils and fully-employed sub-
jects. This finding warrants a careful interpretation of generalizing laboratory findings with 
student subjects about the prevalence of cheating in the population. Apparently, field experi-
ments serve as an important empirical source to replicate behavioral cheating patterns found in 
laboratory studies. In addition to that, experiments conducted in a more natural environment or 
with a heterogeneous subject sample increases scientific knowledge about human conduct 
which might be especially important in the domain of lying and cheating. Thus, complementing 
laboratory research with field experiments offers a promising approach to gain further insights 
about lying preferences and strengthens the accurateness of possible policy implications. 
The fifth paper, Djawadi, B.M., Fahr, R. and Turk, F. (2014), develops a conceptual framework 
which augments standard economic choice theory with psychological concepts of behavioral 
economics to understand how patients’ preferences for discontinuing with therapy arise over 
the course of the medical treatment. The reasons why comprehensive research in health care on 
the causes of non-compliance and non-persistence from a economics perspective is scarce and 
seldom part of the different intervention strategies, are manifold and apparent: 1) The few at-
tempts to economically explain medical non-compliance and non-persistence only consider ra-
tional choice behavior and ignore promising approaches from behavioral economics which aug-
ment standard economic theory along with greater psychological realism (Camerer and Loe-
wenstein, 2003). 2) There is no theoretical framework which captures the dynamic nature of 
compliance behavior and links the individual decision to the observed outcome over time.  3) 
The empirical research based on observational data or clinical studies lacks the ability to iden-
tify the general drivers of the patient’s decision-making process to discontinue with therapy. 
Instead, existing clinical meta-analyses and retrospective studies identify determinants which 
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imply correlations rather than causal relationships with observed outcomes (Mihalko et al., 
2004). Our conceptual framework models the patient as active economic agent who evaluates 
the benefits and costs for continuing with therapy. We argue that a combination of loss aversion 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and mental accounting operations (Thaler, 1985; 1999) explain 
why patients discontinue with therapy at a specific point in time. To isolate the economic driv-
ers of the underlying decision-making process, we abstract from any medical context and trans-
fer the key components of a conventional medical treatment into an equivalent economic in-
vestment setting. The decision environment in the investment setting differs from the medica-
tion intake only in the fact that individuals are confronted with economic goods rather than 
medication products. Framed as a simple investment game over discrete time, we design a la-
boratory experiment in which participating student subjects make repeated decisions on two 
investment options with different risk profiles and outcome probabilities. The two investment 
options represent the economic equivalent of either continuing or discontinuing with therapy. 
Consistent with the predictions of our conceptual framework, subjects continue with therapy as 
long as experienced utility losses have to be compensated. As soon as prior losses are evened 
out, subjects perceive the marginal benefit of compliance lower than in the beginning of the 
treatment. Consequently, subjects start to discontinue with therapy. It is evident from observed 
behavior and revealed preferences in the laboratory that subjects’ choices are not aligned with 
rational choice theory. Instead, loss aversion and the diminishing sensitivity of future gains 
account for the increasing tendency of subjects during the course of a treatment to discontinue 
with therapy at a specific point in time. Incorporated in our conceptual framework, concepts of 
bounded rationality and behavioral economics seem to capture the dynamic nature of medical 
non-persistence much better than standard economic models and generate more accurate pre-
dictions about how patients behave under circumstances characterized by risk and uncertainty. 
The sixth paper, Djawadi, B.M., Fahr, R. and Turk, F. (2016), uses the procedure of behavioral 
economic engineering to develop and test three different financial incentive schemes aimed at 
improving compliance behavior in therapeutic treatments. Unlike field experiments where the 
researcher is interested whether the effect found in the laboratory prevails in a more natural 
environment, behavioral economic engineering pursues the other direction: real-world institu-
tions are brought into the laboratory, and mechanisms are tested that align individual incentives 
and behavior with the underlying goals (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2014). Drawing on theories 
from behavioral economics and the conceptual framework of medical non-compliance, loss 
aversion and the evaluation of future utility gains relative to a reference point are decisive for 
the individual decision to non-comply. Based on this knowledge, three financial incentive 
schemes grounded in concepts of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985; 1999), prospect theory 
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and choice bracketing (Read et al., 1999) are elaborated. Sub-
sequently, their effectiveness on compliant behavior is investigated under the same controlled 
experimental conditions, allowing for clear causal inferences on observed behavior. We design 
a randomized laboratory experiment in which participants decide in analogy to an investment 
plan between compliance and non-compliance. The economic consequences as trade-off be-
tween benefits and costs for compliant behavior and the entailed risks of suffering a medical 
relapse are modeled as monetary lotteries which participants are asked to choose between in 
each period. We find that a financial incentive scheme based on prospect theory significantly 
increases compliance behavior. By lowering the costs of compliance in situations in which 
losses have been compensated, the economic gain of being compliant remains attractive and 
leads subjects to significantly comply more compared to the baseline experiment with no in-
centives at all. Referring to medical treatments, this finding implies that an incentive program 
of lowering copayments of the medicine prescribed to the patients during the course of the 
treatment is an effective way in improving compliant behavior. In contrast to these results, we 
do not find any change in compliance when we use a deposit contract to increase loss aversion 
in the beginning of a treatment or through the use of a bonus system aimed at enhancing rational 
choice behavior.  
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